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TORTS-CLASSES OF BENEFICIARIES IN DEATH
BY WRONGFUL ACT STATUTE
On December 30, 1951 plaintiff's decedent, fourteen years of
age, was killed when defendant's automobile, which he occupied
as a guest and which was parked crosswise on Route 60 east of
Clifton Forge, was violently struck by the oncoming car of another
defendant. Plaintiff brought action under the death by wrongful
act statute' against the owner of the car occupied by the decedent
and against the driver Of the other automobile involved in the
accident. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict for the
defendants. Upon appeal, held, reversed and remanded to the trial
court for a new trial limited to the issue of the amount of damages
to be awarded, and the apportionment thereof, to the statutory
beneficiaries. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that when un-
contradicted evidence shows that the automobile was crosswise in
the road, either because of the act of the defendant or of his agent
in his presence, defendant was guilty of gross negligence with
reference to the decedent and was liable for his death, as was also
the driver of the automobile who had approached at excessive
speed without keeping a proper lookout.' Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195
Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953).
In this case the inequity of the inflexibility of the classes
provided by the Code' is manifest. Decedent's parents separated
before his birth and were later divorced. His father never con-
tributed in any way to his support, and his mother cared for him
only until he was eighteen months old, at which time she placed
the child with her parents and obtained employment in another
town. Later she remarried and now has five children by her second
marriage. Although decedent continued to live with his grand&
parents, he visited his mother at reasonable intervals and she con-
tributed in a minor way to his support. Following the applicable
1. Virginia Code of 1950, §8-633 ("Whenever the death of a person shall be caused
by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person or corporation...and the act.
neplect. or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the Pas
injured to maintain an action...and to recover damages in respect thereof, then, an
in every such case, the person who, or corporation...which, would have been liable.
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages...").
2. Virginia Code of 1950, §8-636 (Cue. Supp. 1952) ("Amount and distribution
of damages.-The jury in any such action may award suds damages as to it may seem
fair and just, not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars. and may direct in what
proportion they shall be distributed to the surviving widow or husband and children
and grandchildren of the deceased, or if there be none such, then to the parents, brothers
and sisters of the deceased. Nothing shall be apportioned to the parents, brothers and
sisters of the deceased, if there be a surviving widow or husband, children or grand-
children. ba between members of th e class the jury shall have absolute dis-
cretion as to who shall receive the whole or any part of the recovery.").
statutory provisions, the court held that the mother and the father,
even though the latter had never contributed to the support of the
decedent, and the brother and four sisters of the half blood fall
within the same class and may participate in the damages awarded
if the jury or trial court should specify, while the faithful grand-
parents who had furnished almost all of his support were entirely
excluded.
An award to the father of the decedent of any part of the
damages would be completely against equity and good conscience.
It is doubtful, but not impossible, that a jury would award part
of the damages to the father, but even a remote possibility of such
an award should be eliminated by a statutory provision divesting
a parent of his rights under the death by wrongful act statute when
such parent has abandoned his child. Even without such a statutory
provision, it would seem that in the face of such gross unfairness,
where the family relationship is a purely biological one, the court
should be allowed to make a judicial exception to the class provided
by statute.
The language of the court indicates that this may be the first
Virginia case, involving collaterals of the half blood, brought under
the death by wrongful act statute. At first blush the court's holding
may seem inconsistent with the statute of descent and distribution.!
However, it is only logical to consider them "brothers and sisters"
within the statute since they are treated by no express provision,
and where the distributees named in the statute of descent and dis-
tribution are different from the beneficiaries named in the statute
in question, the provisions of the latter control.' Also, it must be
remembered that under the death by wrongful act statute the jury
has absolute discretion as to who, among the members of the same
class, shall receive the whole or any part of the recovery. Theoret-
ically, it will take into consideration the actual family situation as
well as the blood relationship.
Since the mother did make some small contribution to the
support of the decedent and did recognize him as her child, she
should .receive some compensation for his death. However, to give
her the entire award of damages would be unfair, and as she is the
3. Virnia Code of 1950. 64-2 ("How collaterals of half blood inherit-Collaterals
of tbe half blood shall inherit only half so moch as those of the whole blood; bat if all
the colLaterals be of the half blood, the ascending kindred, if my, shall haw double
4. v. Edwards, 1s1 V. 344. 25 SE.2d 343 (1943).
only member of the class who is equitably entitled to any of the
award she will probably receive it all. The grandparents who have
stood in loco parentis to the decedent since he was eighteen months
old take no share whatsoever in the award of damages for the
death of their protege. This rank injustice is occasioned by the
narrow scope and inelasticity of the classes of statutory beneficaries.
The remedy is a legislative one. The hands of the court are tied,
and it can only apportion damages among members of the classes,
which are clearly defined by statute. The absolute exclusiveness of
the classes of beneficiaries and the resulting injustice are further
illustrated by the case of Porter v. Virginia Electric and Power
Co.' where a decedent left a surviving husband and a widowed
mother but no children or gkandchildren. The court held that the
language, providing that where the decedent has left a widowed
mother and also a widow the amount recovered shall be divided
between the mother and the widow, could not be so construed as
to include a widower.
The death by wrongful act statute was originally enacted to rem-
edy an inequitable situation. The right of action to recover for wrong-
ful death did not exist at common law, and the wrongdoer was
immune to civil liability.' It appears that the rigid and restrictive
provision for classes of beneficiaries is thwarting the statute's
equitable intention and primary object of compensating the family
of the deceased. The Virginia statute is the equivalent of Lord
Campbell's Act,' under which the term "parent" included grand-
parents and step-parents. When the Virginia General Assembly
enacted the death by wrongful act statute in 1871,' it did not see
fit to include the English interpretation of "parent". The original
Virginia statute had but one class of beneficiaries, "wife, husband,
parent, and child of the deceased".! In 1904 the statute was
amended to provide for two classes of beneficiaries, "wife, husband,
and child" constituting the preferred class and the deferred class
consisting of "parents, brothers, and sisters of the deceased".' In
the Code of 1919 grandchildren were added to the preferred class,'
5. 183 Vs. 108, 31 S.M.2d 337 (1944).
6. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Decatur. 173 V. 153. 3 S.E.2d 172. 4 S..2d 294
. (1939). c
7. 9 & 10 Vict.. c.9 14)
8. Acts of Assembly 1870-71. p. 27.
9. Virginia Code of 1873. Ch. 145, HI 8 and 9.
10. Acts of Assembly 1904, p. 110.
11. Virginia Code of 1919. 15788. (Revisors' Note.--...Under the fomer seaio,
grandchildren were no, put either in the preferred or deferred class. but the revised
section plac them in prerr cla. .The a . of grandr for thei
grandchildren was conside greater than that for collateral kindred.')
and no change in the classes of beneficiaries has been made since
then.
The inequitable result of Wolfe v. Lockhart, supra, was not
occasioned by a misapplication by the court of a statute but by the
inadequacy of the statute as it now reads. It is illustrative of the
grave necessity for a re-evaluation by the General Assembly of the
death by wrongful act statute, particularly Section 8-636. There
are several remedies suggested by a consideration of this case. One
is to enact a statute divesting a parent of his rights under the
death by wrongful act statute when the court determines that he
has previously abandoned the child. The Georgia Civil Code of
1895, Section 2502, gave the father a cause of action for damages
for the loss of a child's services but also provided that this parental
power is lost "(1) by voluntary contract, releasing the right to a
third person; (2) by consenting to the adoption of the child by
a third person; (3) by the failure of the father to provide neces-
saries for his child, or his abandonment"." Another remedy would
be a definitive provision enlarging and interpreting the term
"parents" to include such people as the court determines have
stood in loco parentis to the decedent. This should include foster
parents, adoptive parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles and any
others who might be appropriate beneficiaries.
Even assuming that these two obvious defects have been
remedied, there are still many conceivable situations in which a
strict application of the statute would work an injustice. For ex-
ample, a person might be killed, leaving an aged sister dependent
upon him for support and a grandchild independently wealthy.
By a strict application of the statute the court would have to
award the entire recovery to the grandchild, because he is in the
preferred class. This is clearly unjust, and there should be a
statutory provision giving the court the power to waive application
of the classes of beneficiaries provided by the statute when such
application would work a gross inequity.
Another problem is presented by consideration of a hypo-
thetical situation involving the wrongful death of an adopted child.
In Virginia the adopted child inherits through his natural parents
and through his adoptive parents, but there has been no case
determining whether the natural parents could share in the award
12. Southern Ry. Co. v. Flemister. 120 Ga. 524. 48 S.E 160 (1904).
if they have allowed their child to be legally adopted. Also, there
has been no case involving the situation where the decedent is a
legally-adopted child and has foster brothers and sisters. In such a
case the court would probably consider the foster brothers and
sisters as brothers and sisters within the meaning of the statute,
as it did concerning the collaterals of the half blood in Wolfe v.
Lockhart. These situations are bound to arise in an age in which
adoptions are becoming increasingly numerous, and a re-evaluation
and reconstruction of the statute should consider these possibilities
and make provision therefor.
As now provided, the classes of beneficiaries under the death
by wrongful act statute are too restrictive and too inflexible to
promote the ends of justice. The classes should be enlarged and
relaxed and the court given a freer rein in the application thereof.
Social legislation that has not been amended since 1919 cannot be
expected to be adequate in the complexity of today's society, and
a re-evaluation in the light of thirty-five years' experience would
be in order.
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